FROM THE ASHES OF THE PHOENIX: LESSONS FOR CONTEMPORARY COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
The Vietnam War was the most controversial conflict in American history; it wreaked havoc on society, colored a generation's perception of its government, and devastated the military. Its specter casts a shadow over every American political debate about the use of force abroad. As the first defeat in U.S. military history, most soldiers would rather forget it completely; when studied at all, it is usually in a negative sense -what to avoid, how not to operate, etc. Disgusted with the inherently messy nature of counterinsurgency, the Army turned its attention after the war to the kind of wars it prefers to fight -conventional, symmetric conflict.
1 While a number of civilian scholars examined the war, the Army focused on how to defeat the Soviets on the plains of Europe. 2 While academic historians often deride the military for trying to re-fight the last war, in this instance no one can accuse the Army of that sin. Through its doctrine, scenarios at its officer education system and national training centers, and almost every aspect of force development, the Army has remained singularly focused on fighting a conventional conflict. The result was spectacular performance in both conventional wars with
Iraq. Today, however, the Army finds itself in the middle of a major counterinsurgency -this This paper examines one major aspect of that conflict, the attack on the Viet Cong The struggle … is in essence a struggle for political domination…The primary issue is control over people…our adversaries have generally employed armed force…primarily as a political abrasive intended to cow the population into submission, collapse all political structures … and erode the appetite for struggle …the ultimate measure of success or failure will not be relative casualties … but-instead-whose political writ runs … over the population of South Vietnam.
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To pursue their struggle for political supremacy, the North Vietnamese established an unconventional warfare force within South Vietnam. The nucleus of this force was a clandestine element of three thousand political and five thousand armed military cadre, who had remained in the south after the July 1954 Geneva settlement. 14 The intent of these agents was to mobilize support for the Communists in the elections that were to occur in accordance with the Geneva Accords. Once it was clear that the South Vietnamese would not hold such elections, they used this infrastructure to conduct an unconventional war against the Diem government. 15 The VC insurgency, instituted, directed, and supported by the North Vietnamese, had two The Phoenix Program established committees and coordination centers at the national, corps, province, and district level. In addition, it directed the participation of key representatives from civil government, police, security services, and military organizations operating in the area. 23 At province level and above, these committees served largely to provide guidance and policy direction. 24 They also established quotas at the province and district levels for efforts to neutralize the enemy's infrastructure. 25 The national level Phoenix committee established evidentiary rules and judicial procedures, specified categories and priorities of a variety of targets, and defined incarceration periods tied to target category. 26 At province and district level, Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (PIOCC/DIOCC) served as the foci of all-source intelligence fusion on VCI-related reports and operational planning to execute operations against VCI. 27 The centers provided a mechanism to consolidate information from the numerous organizations operating on the battlefield, deconflict intelligence collection activities, and plan and coordinate operations. The United
States primarily provided military advisors at the PIOCC/DIOCC level. Advisory staffs at higher levels tended to have greater interagency representation. At the province level, the U.S. advisor was tasked to:
…form and chair a Province PHOENIX Committee composed of all principal members of the US official community capable of contributing effectively to the attack on the VCI… [and] work in close conjunction with the counterpart GVN coordinating committee to bring together an effective GVN/US team to optimize intelligence support and coordination of the dual effort against VC armed units and the VCI. 28 At the District level, which was the primary operational planning and execution element, the U.S. advisor was responsible for:
-Providing timely military intelligence support to tactical units and security forces.
-Achieving rapid, first-level collation, evaluation, and dissemination of VCI intelligence.
-Generating police, military, or special exploitation operations to disrupt, harass, capture, eliminate, or neutralize local VCI. 29 The understanding that the principal objective was to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the population led inevitably to the realization that large-scale combat operations were counterproductive to pacification goals. 30 According to MACV Directive 381-41, the intent of Phoenix was to attack the VCI with a "'rifle shot' rather than a shotgun approach to the central targetkey political leaders, command/control elements and activists in the VCI." 31 Heavy-handed operations, such as random cordon and searches, large-scale and lengthy detentions of innocent civilians, and excessive use of firepower had a negative effect on the civilian population. Government forces appeared inept and unable to meet the security and stability needs of the people -in other words they were on occasion the main threat to these goals.
Unfocused, large-scale operations usually failed to kill or destroy the infrastructure, which controlled large sections of the population or critical support functions; rather, they were more likely to net easily replaceable guerrilla fighters. The Phoenix approach also acknowledged that capturing VCI was more important than killing them. 32 Captured VCI were the prime source of information to identify future targets. Focused, police-like operations were much more likely to achieve this end than large-scale military ones.
Over time, the Phoenix program generated negative press coverage, accusations that it was a U.S. government sponsored-assassination program, and eventually a series of Congressional hearings. Consequently, MACV issued a directive that reiterated that it had based the anti-VCI campaign on South Vietnamese law, that the program was in compliance with the laws of land warfare, and that U.S. personnel had the responsibility to report breaches of the law. 33 That directive described Phoenix operational activities as:
Operations…against the VCI…include: the collection of intelligence identifying these members; inducing them to abandon their allegiance to the VC and rally to the government; capturing or arresting them in order to bring them before province security committees or military courts for lawful sentencing; and as a final resort, the use of reasonable force should they resist capture or arrest where failure to use such force would result in the escape of the suspected VCI member or would result in threat of serious bodily harm to a member or members of the capturing or arresting party.
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Clearly, the intent of these operations was not indiscriminate killing and assassination;
unfortunately, decentralized operations in an uncertain, ambiguous environment did lead to abuses. 35 Officially, Phoenix operations continued until December 1972, although certain aspects continued until the fall of South Vietnam in 1975. 36 Like the Vietnam War that spawned it, the Phoenix Program was, and continues to be, a subject of controversy. To some, it was an assassination program, carried out against innocents, and symbolic of the moral bankruptcy of the entire war. 37 For others, it was a benign coordination mechanism that offered "the best hope for victory" in the Vietnam War. 38 Like any controversial issue, the truth probably lies somewhere in between. Regardless, Phoenix was the U.S. government's largest and most systematic effort to destroy the insurgency's political and support infrastructure -a critical element in a counterinsurgency campaign. Ultimately, the entire counterinsurgency in Vietnam was a failure, for a variety of reasons; clearly, one critical factor was that the VC had established a large and effective support cadre throughout South Vietnam before a coordinated effort was undertaken to eradicate it. 39 While indications are that Phoenix achieved considerable success in damaging that infrastructure, it was too little and too late to change the war's overall course.
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TODAY'S INSURGENT THREAT
Vietnam was a classic example of a mass-oriented insurgency. 41 The VC sought to discredit the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government in the eyes of the population through a protracted campaign of violence, while offering its own parallel political structure as a viable alternative to the 'illegitimate' government. 42 The 'battlefield' in a mass-oriented insurgency is the population -both the government and the insurgents fight for the support of the people.
As one author has suggested, both sides in this type of conflict have two tools in the struggle for control and support of the populace: "…popular perceptions of legitimacy and a credible power to coerce." 43 He goes on the note that the target of coercion, the populace, defines the threat's credibility, not the employer of the threat. 44 Consequently, conventional military power does not necessarily equate to credible coercive power. The conventional force may possess state of the art weaponry and overwhelming destructive power. Nevertheless, if the populace believes it will not or cannot be used against them, it has limited coercive valueparticularly if the insurgent is able to punish noncompliant members of the populace and reward supporters. Army doctrine establishes three general phases of development for an insurgent movement. It acknowledges that not every insurgency passes through each phase and that success is not contingent upon linear progression through the three phases. The first phase is the latent or incipient phase. In it, the insurgent movement focuses on recruiting, organizing, and training key membership, as well as establishing inroads into legitimate organizations to facilitate support of its objectives. It establishes the clandestine cellular support structure that facilitates intelligence collection and operational actions, and infiltrates its supporters into critical positions within governmental and civilian organizations. 47 The insurgency uses only selected violence during this phase in order to avoid provoking an effective regime response before the insurgency can respond. 48 Once the insurgency has established its support infrastructure, it violently challenges the government. In phase II, guerrilla warfare, the insurgent movement takes active measures to challenge the regime's legitimacy. This can include attacks, assassinations, sabotage, or subversive activities (such as information operations). 49 In a rural-based insurgency, the insurgents are often able to operate from relatively secure base camps. In an urban-based insurgency, the members rely on the anonymity of urban areas to conceal their presence within the population.
In phase III, mobile warfare or war of movement, guerrilla forces transition to conventional warfare and directly confront government security forces. If properly timed, the government has been weakened sufficiently to succumb to assault by insurgent forces. This phase takes on the character of a civil war, in which the insurgents may control and administer significant portions of terrain by force of arms. 55 The MI 2 directs, supports, and sustains the execution of violence against the regime; it constitutes the insurgency's center of gravity.
There are several disincentives to attacking this source of power; however, it must be neutralized to defeat the insurgency. The infrastructure component is harder to find than the armed elements and is less susceptible to U.S. technology-focused intelligence collection 
CONTEMPORARY INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACK
Five years of operational experience against the VCI yielded significant lessons at the tactical, operational and strategic level. The focus of the remainder of this paper is on those strategic lessons most relevant to an attack against the MI 2 . One can classify those lessons into three major categories: command and control, operations, and legal/ethical issues.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Identification of Objectives
Defining 
Unity of Command
One of the most significant successes of the Phoenix program lay in the establishment unity of command among disparate civilian agencies and military organizations. 57 The Phoenix
Program, led by a civilian deputy in CORDs under the Commander, MACV, essentially created an interagency command element to unite civilian and military lines of command. 58 The
PIOCCs and DIOCCs enabled interagency cooperation and coordination at the operational and tactical level; unfortunately, there was no mechanism to enforce cooperation. Consequently, while senior leaders synchronized objectives at the highest level, organizations might still be working at cross-purposes at lower levels. This was particularly true in the intelligence arena, where organizational rivalries often hindered intelligence sharing, as agencies treated their best sources and critical pieces of intelligence in a proprietary manner. 59 Timely and accurate intelligence is essential for counterinsurgency forces to execute focused operations, which limit negative effects on the population. Compartmented intelligence processes impede development of a comprehensive picture of the insurgent's infrastructure -a picture that one can only 'assemble'' by compiling the various 'pieces' collected by all the participants in the counterinsurgency effort.
The U.S. government must unify today's counterinsurgency operation at every level. The U.S. should establish an interagency counterinsurgency task force, empowered to establish objectives, set priorities, and direct operations. The decision to appoint a single director for the nation's intelligence agencies represents a useful first step in establishing unity of the intelligence effort; however, the United States must wield all the elements of national power in a coordinated fashion. Currently, the National Security Council is the only integrating point for the departments; it does not possess the design or staff to plan and execute the detailed application of national power required to defeat a global insurgency.
Unity of command should extend down to the tactical level. Fora based on cooperation, such as the PIOCCs and DIOCCS in Vietnam, are largely personality dependent -they only work well when the participants 'mesh;' they fail when personalities clash. Organizational structures, empowered to direct interagency counterinsurgency tasks, must exist at every level.
While this might seem an usurpation of departmental responsibilities, the global counterinsurgency campaign needs singularly focused direction and supervision by an organization empowered by the President to direct departmental cooperation at all level. There were two problems with such an approach; first, it confused MOPs with MOEs.
Metrics
Numbers of neutralizations that a subordinate element executed might be a valid MOP; i.e. it demonstrated whether or not the organization was actively pursuing VCI personnel.
Neutralization numbers confused actions with effectiveness. The objective of the Phoenix Program was to limit the VCI's ability to support operations and exercise control over the population. Neutralization numbers did not measure whether Phoenix was effective. 60 The second problem with the Phoenix quotas was that they caused dysfunctional organizational behavior. Driven to achieve neutralization quotas, police and military units often detained innocent civilians in imprecise cordon and sweep operations. 61 The overburdened legal system then took weeks or months to process detainees; the jails and holding areas provided the VC with an excellent environment for recruiting and indoctrinating previously apolitical civilians. 62 The quota system bred corruption, as families paid bribes to secure the release of their relatives while others settled personal scores by identifying their personal enemies as VCI. 63 While reforms eventually corrected many of the deficiencies in the Phoenix Program, the lesson for current counterinsurgency operations is clear. Metrics designed to measure organizational effectiveness and performance can significantly influence the conduct of operations, both positively and negatively. It is critical to establish MOEs tied to operational objectives. Simple attritional numbers, while easily produced, more often than not are meaningless. For example, neutralizing 75% of Al Qaeda's leadership seems to indicate effective operations. However, without considering issues such as replacements, criticality of losses, or minimum required personnel levels to direct operations, one cannot truly assess the effect of operations. Useful MOEs require a significant understanding of the enemy, the capability to collect detailed feedback on effects, and a major analytical effort. Consequently, the tendency may be to fall back on more easily collected, attrition-focused statistics. The experience of the Phoenix Program suggests that it may be better not to use metrics at all, rather than to use inappropriate ones.
OPERATIONS
Combined Operations
Analysis of the Phoenix Program suggests that infrastructure attack operations are best done in a combined manner, with U.S. military and civilian organizations in a support or advisory role to host nation counterparts. In order to achieve its aim of a 'rifle shot,' Phoenix operations more closely resembled police operations than military ones. 64 Such focused operations require a level of cultural understanding and local area knowledge that only a native can achieve. Attempts to operate unilaterally, without such expertise, can result in indiscriminate use of force and firepower, lost opportunities and a disenchanted, anti-American civilian population.
Combined operations, but with clear American primacy, can send the message that indigenous organizations are inept or incapable. In the battle for legitimacy, it is critical that the regime not only is effective, but that the populace believes it to be effective. Overt U.S.
presence often provides the insurgent with ammunition for his information campaign; insurgent groups in Iraq have leveraged charges of neo-colonialism against the United States to good effect in order to rally nationalists to their cause. The less a regime appears to have surrendered control of basic governmental functions, the better it can deflect the insurgent's propaganda messages and gain or retain the allegiance of the populace.
The Vietnam experience demonstrates that there is significant incentive to minimize combined operations with indigenous forces. The VC infiltrated the South Vietnamese government and security apparatus at every level, which decreased operational effectiveness. 65 This, coupled with the belief that U.S. forces were more capable than the host nation forces, resulted in an American tendency to marginalize South Vietnamese operational participation and inhibited a wider dissemination of intelligence, even between U.S. organizations. 
Advisors
The competence of Americans advising the South Vietnamese organizations tasked with executing the Phoenix Program was a significant limiting factor. Phoenix advisors were often young, inexperienced, and lacked appropriate skills, which prevented Phoenix from reaching its full potential. 68 As the program matured, the U.S. instituted training programs and improved personnel selection policies to increase the quality and experience level of advisors. house, process, and adjudicate the large numbers of detainees the Phoenix Program generated dramatically hampered its overall effectiveness. 72 In many cases, the system became a revolving door, with hard-core VCI released prematurely. In other cases, lengthy detainment of innocents abetted the enemy's recruitment effort. 73 Detainee interrogations provided the best source of targeting information; however, accusations of inhumane treatment weakened the regime's legitimacy.
Captured insurgents must be dealt with by a fair, responsive, and firm system. The U.S.
can directly influence this issue with insurgents captured under its jurisdiction; it can indirectly influence the issue with governments to which it provides aid and advice. To retain legitimacy, America must maintain moral ascendancy. For example, while indefinite incarceration of Al Qaeda detainees in Guantanamo may be legal, it may not be in the long-term best interest of the counterinsurgency. It has negatively impacted relations with coalition partners and contributed to a negative image of America. 74 To minimize its exposure to criticism, the U.S.
has used agreements that return captives to their nation of origin for disposition, while still allowing U.S. intelligence agencies access for interrogation purposes ('rendition'). 75 This procedure invites accusations that the United States is using surrogates to do its "dirty" work. In the long term, the United States must establish a process, in cooperation with its coalition partners, which yields intelligence for future operations, prevents detainees from rejoining the insurgency, meets basic legal and ethical standards, and maintains U.S. legitimacy. 
CONCLUSION
